In November of 2006, 80% of voters will cast their vote electronically. Electronic voting machines have contributed to elections that are increasingly vulnerable to vote manipulation and human error. The security failings of electronic voting machines, also known as Direct Recording Electronic (DREs), endanger the most basic right of citizens in a democracy to cast their vote and have it counted. These DRE machines can be made far more secure with the addition of voter-verifiable paper trails and regular audits.
Diebold voting machines are the most commonly used DREs. Independent studies from Princeton University and Johns Hopkins University found alarming security flaws in the use of the Diebold machines. Both studies established that the Diebold machines have a number of serious flaws. Most significantly they are vulnerable to the manipulation of votes through malicious software and viruses. One Johns Hopkins researcher wrote that one person could cast multiple votes for the same candidate using a counterfeit voting card capable of being manufactured by a 15 year old.
Diebold machines have also drawn attention because of a comments made by Walden O'Dell, Diebold's Chief Executive. Just prior to the 2004 U.S. Presidential election O'Dell stated, "I am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year." The Ohio vote subsequently played a key role in the re-election of George W. Bush, amid widespread allegations of fraud. One voting machine in Ohio was found to have cast 4,258 votes for Bush when there were only 638 voters in the entire district. In the absence of a voter-verifiable paper trail, this kind of "error" would have gone undetected in larger districts. ("Ohio Tally Fit for Ukraine", New York Daily News, November 20, 2004)
Security concerns with electronic voting are not limited to Diebold machines. A task force of voting experts convened by the Brennan Center tested multiple electronic voting systems, including Diebold machines, and found that all were vulnerable to vote tampering in the absence of voter-verifiable paper trails and regular vote audits.
Poorly designed ballots (such as candidate lists that do not allow the voter to see all of their choices on the same screen) and unclear instructions common to the electronic voting process are also of concern. These have a large and significant effect on the "residual vote rate" which is the difference between the number of votes cast and the number counted. Low-income and minority voters are most likely to have their votes considered invalid when the residual vote rate increases. (Brennan Center for Justice Issue Brief, "Restrictions on Voter Registration Drives", September 2006.) Click here for information on the role of electronic voting in disrupting the 2004 Maryland primary election.
"…our analysis shows that this voting system [paperless electronic voting] is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts…We conclude that this voting system is unsuitable for use in a general election."
-(Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute Technical Report, 2003)
"All three [electronic] voting systems have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities which pose a real danger to the integrity of national, state, and local elections…The most troubling vulnerabilities of each system can be substantially remedied if proper countermeasures are implemented at the state and local level."
-The Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security. (Included researchers and practitioners from U.C. Berkeley, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, MIT and the Electronic Privacy Information Center.)
"We found that the machine [the Diebold AccuVote-TS] is vulnerable to a number of extremely serious attacks that undermine the accuracy and credibility of the vote counts it produces…many computer scientists doubt that paperless DREs can be made reliable and secure, and they expect that any failures of such systems would likely go undetected."
"A voter-verifiable paper trail is the most important safeguard that can make e-voting machines more secure."
-Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine, Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton University, 2006
Electronic systems must include a "voter-verifiable" paper trail and regular audits. These paper trails are a powerful safeguard against electronic voting manipulation, especially when they are subjected to regular audits. Currently 27 states require voter verifiable paper trails, but only 12 require audits to ensure that the paper records match the electronic records.
Low-income and minority voters are most likely to have their votes considered invalid when the residual vote rate (the difference between the number of votes cast and the number counted) increases. Electronic ballots must be well designed and instructions for how to use the machines must be accessible to voters with no prior experience with computers.
State and local jurisdictions must act to ensure faith in the accuracy of our vote by fixing identified flaws in the Diebold machines and by implementing far more rigid processes and training to mitigate human error. Voting is the most fundamental right of all American citizens.
A loss of faith in the voting process undermines the foundation of American democracy. The implementation of a voter-verifiable paper trail and regular random audits for all electronic voting machines are crucial to avoiding an irreversible hijacking of the American voting process and to protecting voters' trust in the foundation of our democracy.
Brennan Center Issue in Brief, "Problems with New Voting Technology":
Consumer Protection for Elections:
Election Reform Information Project:
NAACP National Civic Engagement Policy Manager, Carolina Espinal [410.463.2940, cespinal@naacpnet.org]
NAACP National Civic Engagement Coordinator, Cherese N. Williams [410.580.5652, cnwilliams@naacpnet.org]
Press Contact: John C. White, NAACP Communications Director: [410.580.5127, jwhite@naacpnet.org]
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