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Introduction
In 1940, Richard Wright introduced America to Bigger Thomas in the author’s signature work, Native Son. Bigger is a 20-year-old black male with an 8th grade education. He lives on the south side of Chicago, Illinois, with his mother and younger siblings. The Thomas family suffers through economic privation and social isolation, as they share a rat-infested, one-room apartment in the city’s black belt. Ms. Thomas, the family’s lone wage earner, struggles to support three children on an insufficient income. Bigger, thinking about his family’s living conditions, his own life chances, and the constraints of race and class in America, says:
Every time I think about it I feel like somebody’s poking a
red-hot iron down my throat. Goddammit, look! We live
here and they live there. We black and they white. They
got things and we ain’t. They do things and we can’t. It’s
just like living in jail. Half the time I feel like I’m on the
outside of the world peeping in through a knot-hole in the
fence...” 1
Ever frustrated by racial divisions, he adds, “Every time I get to thinking about me being black and they being white, me being here and they being there, I feel like something awful’s going to happen to me.” 2
Something terrible does happen to Bigger. In the final section of Native Son, Bigger is sentenced to death row for his crimes against white society, offenses that are both real and contrived. Bigger’s demise is, in part, a result of his own decisions and actions. Yet, Bigger Thomas is also an American creation—a native son, the product of virulent racism, denial of educational and employment opportunities, and hopelessness.
Racial minorities have made great strides in the United States since the onset of the modern civil rights movement during the 1950s. The quest to gain equal status, however, was far from complete. Today, blacks trail whites on nearly every measure of socioeconomic well-being (Table 1). Much of the same can be said for other groups, as racial minorities have been systematically relegated to lower stations in American society.
Nowhere are these struggles more evident than in the lives of youth from communities of color, particularly males of color. Despite advances during the last several decades, millions of boys and young men still face daunting challenges in obtaining an education, finding quality jobs, and becoming productive members of the American community.
Education is viewed as the great equalizer, and society often looks to the school system to solve its problems. 3 Yet, high school graduation and college preparedness rates for minorities lag behind the rates for white youth. Nationally, the public high school graduation rate remained flat between 1991 and 2002 (72 percent in 1991 versus 71 percent in 2002), although the percentage of students who left public high schools with the skills and qualifications necessary to enroll in college increased from 25 percent in 1991 to 34 percent in 2002. 4 In 2002, however, while 78 percent of whites graduated from high school with a regular diploma, only 56 percent of blacks and 52 percent of Latinos finished high school with a regular diploma. Likewise, while 40 percent of whites left high school eligible to pursue a college education, only 23 percent of blacks and 20 percent of Latinos were ready for college. 5
Data on workforce participation offer a similar picture, as unemployment rates for black and Latino males are routinely higher than the rate for whites. In 2004, the black unemployment rate was 10.4 percent, compared with seven percent for Latinos and 4.8 percent for whites. For black males ages 16 to 19, the unemployment rate was 35.6 percent, in contrast to 21.2 percent and 16.3 percent for Latinos and whites, respectively (Table 2). Although unemployment rates in 2004 decreased for all young men ages 20 to 29, minorities were still unemployed at higher rates than their white counterparts.
In this political, economic, and social context, young males of color need guidance and support if they are going to successfully navigate America’s unsteady racial terrain. Moreover, a change in policy is also needed, as retrenchment of the social welfare state and the hardening of criminal justice policies have worked to limit the life chances of males from communities of color. Otherwise, many will become part of a new generation of “native sons” that is undereducated, unemployed, and unprepared for the challenges that they will face in the 21st century. If such children survive into adulthood but fail in life, prison is the one institution waiting to receive them. 6
The Prison Crisis: Inside the Numbers
As of 2003, 2.2 million sentenced inmates were held in America’s adult prisons, up from 204,211 in 1973. 7 If all persons under adult correctional supervision are included, then the number of individuals under the watch of the federal or state criminal justice systems increases to 6.9 million. 8 Between 1973 and 2003, the incarceration rate grew from 93 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents to 482 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents. This increase is astounding, especially considering that, between 1923 and 1973, incarceration was “strikingly stable” at an average rate of 110 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents. 9 The increase is particularly puzzling given that crime rates fluctuated during the 1980s and then dropped each year between 1992 and 2000.
To contain expanding inmate populations, the number of state prisons grew from 592 in 1974 to 1,023 by June 2000. 10 By this date, there were a total of 1,668 correctional facilities in the United States. 11 While the state and federal governments operate most of these institutions, private corrections companies have designed, constructed, and managed many others since the mid-1980s.
Troubling racial disparities are evident inside America’s prisons (Table 3). Blacks and Latinos represent 26 percent of the U.S. population, but comprised 63 percent of all inmates under state or federal custody in 2003. Black males accounted for 45 percent of all male inmates and were incarcerated at a rate of 3,405 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents. Latino and white males were imprisoned at rates of 1,231 per 100,000 and 465 per 100,000, respectively. Black men between the ages of 25 and 29 had the highest incarceration rate of any group: 9,262 per 100,000. Stated differently, about nine percent of all black men between the ages of 25 and 29 were in prison at the end of 2003.
Racial minorities are also disproportionately represented in the nation’s juvenile justice systems. As of October 27, 1999, the latest year for which data are available, there were 134,011 youth in 2,939 juvenile facilities. 12 On any given day during that year, minority youth, who make up 34 percent of the U.S. juvenile population, accounted for 62 percent of the offenders in residential placement. Blacks (1,004 per 100,000), American Indians (632 per 100,000), and Latinos (485 per 100,000) all had higher custody rates than whites (212 per 100,000).
Finally, a greater share of public funds has been committed to America’s prison systems. The federal government increased its expenditures on corrections from $541 million in 1982 to $5.2 billion in 2001, an increase of 861 percent. 13 State expenditures grew 538.4 percent, rising from $6 million in 1982 to $38.4 billion in 2001. Local government spending increased as well, rising from about $3 million in 1982 to $16.7 billion in 2001 (455.3 percent).
Although states and localities spend more money on other functions of government, expenditures have increased at a greater rate for corrections than for other functions. 14 From 1977 to 2001, total state and local expenditures on corrections increased by 1101 percent. This rate of growth outpaced spending increases for education (448 percent), hospitals and health care (482 percent), interest on debt (543 percent), and public welfare (617 percent). 15
These developments have led many analysts and social commentators to suggest that America suffers from a prison-industrial complex (PIC) akin to the military industrial complex that first emerged in the 1950s. The prison-industrial complex, however, is best understood as a
hybrid subgovernment/issue network constructed around the issues of crime, punishment, and prisons. Prisons have become the centerpiece of a multi-billion dollar industry, and several businesses have placed themselves in strategic positions to profit from prison growth. Private corrections firms also have emerged as important actors in U.S. prison systems. At the same time, some communities (especially in California, Florida, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Texas) pursue prisons with the zeal of major cities courting professional sports teams, based on the belief that prisons offer an environmentally clean industry that can bring “recession-proof ” jobs, development, and even federal funds based on U.S. Census counts.
Understanding the American Prison-Industrial Complex
The term “prison-industrial complex” was derived from President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s assessment of the U.S. military apparatus.16 Some suggest that it is a subgovernment comprised of governmental and non-governmental entities that produce policies that further expanded prison systems. 17 Although these accounts are partially correct, the prison-industrial complex is best understood as a hybrid subgovernment/issue network constructed around the issues of crime, punishment, and prisons. The prison-industrial complex has features that are indicative of both subgovernments and issue networks. Like a subgovernment, it has been stable over time and operates in relative obscurity. It also has the attendant members of the “iron triangle” (i.e., congressional committees, executive agencies, and interest groups). Yet, the prison-industrial complex resembles an issue network in two important ways. First, it cuts across the federal, state, and local levels of government. Second, a large number of interest groups move in and out of the policy arena. Some groups are part of the federal or state criminal justice systems (e.g., correctional officer unions, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors), while others operate outside of these systems (e.g., single-issue interest groups, victims’ rights associations, communities in which prisons are situated).
Some groups wield influence at the national level while others are more effective at the lower levels of government. The prison-industrial complex should not be viewed as an all-powerful
replacement to the military-industrial complex, as there are significant differences between the two. First, military service generally improved the employability of soldiers; in contrast, as Wray observes, “With the near abandonment of attempts to rehabilitate or educate prisoners, it is unlikely that most prisoners leave prison better prepared for employment.” 18 Second, the military-industrial complex was almost exclusively powered by the national government, which can deficit-spend. The prison-industrial complex, by comparison, is largely an undertaking of state and local governments, which must balance their budgets. Third, military Keynesianism
consumed the products of the highest technology firms. In contrast, the prison-industrial complex is largely “low tech” and “blue collar,” consuming fewer products from companies such as Boeing or Lockheed Martin as the military-industrial complex did. 19
Prisons have become the centerpiece of a new sub-economy. Now a multi-billion dollar industry, there are trade shows, Internet websites, catalogues, and direct-marketing campaigns dedicated to corrections. The federal and state governments, corporations, small businesses, private corrections companies, and rural communities all seem to have placed themselves in positions to benefit from prison expansion. Although it emerged in earnest during the 1980s and exploded during the 1990s, the prison-industrial complex has it roots in the 1960s. During that time, crime became a national concern and anxious citizens demanded governmental action. Since that time, some elected officials and issue-seeking politicians have used crime to get votes and win office. 20 These developments had significant ramifications for crime and drug control policy, punishment, and prisons.
Changes in Crime and Drug Control Policy
The shifting politics of crime and punishment left an indelible mark on the formulation and implementation of public policy. During the 1960s, federal and state lawmakers began to call for “law and order.” Specifically, they argued that the nation’s crime problem could only
be solved by hardening criminal justice policy. By the 1970s, new policies emphasized deterrence, incapacitation, punishment, and victims’ rights rather than rehabilitation and treatment. This new paradigm was fueled by the campaigns of issue-seeking politicians and commentaries from the scholarly community. During the 1980s and 1990s, the call for “law and order” gave way to the “get tough” movement, which sparked president-led wars on crime and drugs. This movement also targeted juvenile offenders, particularly those living in central cities who were young, black, or Latino. Some scholars portrayed these young people as “super-predators.” At the same time, the liberal perspective on crime and punishment faded into the background as the “get tough” movement enjoyed the support of members of both political parties. In this environment, new policies were adopted that hardened both the adult and juvenile justice systems.
Some of the harshest laws enacted at the federal level of government include:
• The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
• The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970
• The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
• The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
• The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
• The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
These policies helped to facilitate or were influenced by changes in the states. For instance:
• By 2002, 42 states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of “Truth-in-Sentencing,” a measure designed to ensure that offenders served a substantial portion of their court-imposed sentences before being released. Twenty-nine jurisdictions require that offenders serve 85 percent of the court-imposed sentence.
• By 2001, 16 states had abolished early release by discretion of a parole board for all offenders.
• Between 1993 and 1996, 24 states added “Three Strikes and You’re Out” laws to existing sentencing laws. Three Strikes measures have enhanced prison sentences for violent and habitual offenders.
• By the end of the 1990s, all states had some type of mandatory sentencing provision that targeted drug offenders. Following the precedent set by the federal government with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, many states enacted exceptionally harsh penalties for drug crimes involving crack cocaine.
• Between 1992 and 1997, 47 states and the District of Columbia approved measures that made
their juvenile justice systems more punitive. In particular, states made it easier to transfer juveniles to adult criminal justice systems, gave criminal and juvenile courts expanded sentencing options, and changed or removed traditional juvenile court confidentiality provisions by making juvenile records and proceedings more open.
These policies, enacted incrementally, have done little to reduce crime and victimization. They have contributed to soaring incarceration rates across the country, however. They also have led to sizeable increases in the amount of money dedicated to criminal and juvenile justice systems.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The nation’s youth of color are experiencing a time of crisis. They face daunting challenges to securing a good education, finding quality jobs, and becoming productive members of the American community. If we fail to address these issues, millions of young people will be fed into the nation’s criminal justice systems. Already, as Marable states, U.S. prisons have become “vast warehouses, for the poor and unemployed, for low-wage workers and the poorly educated, and, most especially, for Latino and African American males.”21 By focusing almost exclusively on the behavior of the individual, some researchers and lawmakers have lost sight of the political, economic, and social circumstances in which individuals exist. Given the convergence of criminal justice policy and the long-running assault on the social welfare state, imprisonment has become the first response to many of the social problems that burden the poor. Difficulties such as homelessness, unemployment, drug addiction, and mental illness “disappear from public view when the human beings contending with them are relegated to cages.”22 Consequently, policymakers must consider changes that will help to transform the urban communities in which so many of these young people reside. The following policy recommendations flow from the analysis presented in this paper:
The Political Discourse on Crime and Punishment
• Rely on research rather than rhetoric. Lawmakers must weigh the potential intended and unintended consequences of proposed changes in crime and drug control policy.
• Consider how racial minorities have been constructed as targets of public policy.
• Adopt an approach to criminal justice that balances the needs of society, victims, and inmates.
Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes and You’re Out
• Repeal or revise Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes laws that have proven ineffective in the fight against crime and drugs.
Drugs and Imprisonment
• Rescind the 100-to-1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine ratio and other drug sentencing laws that have incarcerated nonviolent offenders while failing to capture “drug kingpins.”
• Divert nonviolent, non-dangerous drug addicts and offenders from the prison system.
The Private Corrections Industry
• Conduct an audit of private correctional institutions to determine: (1) the physical conditions of the inmate population, (2) the effectiveness of inmate rehabilitation programs in these institutions, and (3) the purported cost-savings of private prisons over public institutions.
Juvenile Justice
• Provide family therapy and parent training directed at delinquents or pre-delinquents and their families.
• Divert nonviolent and non-dangerous juveniles from confinement.
• Explore rehabilitation options in community-based programs for youth offenders.
• Increase job opportunities for minority youth.
Rehabilitation and Prisoner Reentry
•Improve alcohol, drug treatment, and ancillary services for inmates during their incarceration.
• Strengthen educational and vocational programs.
• Assist inmates in their re-introduction to society by putting them in touch with institutions and
organizations that might be of assistance upon release.
• Aggressively recruit private businesses to employ inmates after they are released from prison.
Summary: Making Sense of It All
At the end of the day, the politics of crime and punishment took another turn during the 1990s. Coming out of the 1970s, the positions of the major political parties on these issues were fairly clear. The Republicans were the “law and order” party, while Democrats stressed the “root causes” of crime. By the end of the 1990s, however, such partisan delineations were obsolete, as both Democrats and Republicans called for tougher policies. The result was a “punishment frenzy” largely supported by issue-seeking members of both political parties. 23
The intellectual discourse on crime and drug policy continued to produce scholarship that endorsed the greater use of incarceration as a tool in the fight against crime—be the offenders adults or youth. For instance, in 1995, John J. DiIulio wrote an article for The Weekly Standard titled “The Coming of the Super-predators.” He described super-predators as a “demographic crime bomb” of young people who kill at will. He added that super-predators are more likely to
be black, male, and young, and to come from the central city and suffer “moral poverty.” The definition of moral poverty is to be surrounded by “deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults
in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings.” 24 DiIulio, along with former and current drug czars William J. Bennett and John P. Walters, further clarified the theory of moral poverty in Body Count: Moral Poverty—and How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs. They dismissed other explanations for criminal activity, such as destitution, lack of education, lack of opportunity, or racism. According to these authors, the true culprit was abject moral poverty, which promoted “lack of impulse control and lack of empathy.” 25
As a result of moral poverty and changing demographics, it was predicted that, by 2000, there would be “at least 30,000 more murderers, rapists, and muggers on the streets” who “fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprisonment.” 26 The increased use of incarceration was a necessary and proper means of dealing with this menace to society. Bennett, DiIulio, and Walters also recommended that religion be used in the war on crime. Other researchers, including analysts at the National Center for Policy Analysis and the Heritage Foundation, offered similar perspectives and policy recommendations.27
The mass media quickly picked up this terminology and policymakers began to call for new anti-crime and juvenile justice initiatives. Shortly thereafter, these ideas were codified into law with new policies that targeted violent and repeat offenders. Likewise, between 1992 and 1997, 47 states and the District of Columbia adopted laws that made their juvenile justice systems more punitive.28 The much anticipated crime wave, however, never materialized and young people actually contributed to declining crime rates during the 1990s.29
In the final analysis, other scholars were more accurate in their assessments of crime policy. For instance, some researchers noted that ideas about the so-called underclass were driving a “new penology” that emphasized “low-cost management of a permanent offender population.” 30 Others argued that, with the wars on crime and drugs, police adopted more aggressive tactics when patrolling black and Latino communities. 31 Such practices—powered by a racialized fear of crime—exacerbated racial disparities in arrests, jailing, and imprisonment. Still, some plainly remarked, “the conceptual building blocks of the conservative rhetoric on crime and its
control were fallacious.”32 These analyses, however insightful, were not heeded. Thus, lawmakers must be wiser consumers of policy research in the future.
3 Clarke E. Cochran, Lawrence C. Mayer, T. R. Carr, and N. Joseph Cayer, eds., American Public Policy: An introduction, 7th Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003); Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 10th Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2001).
4 Jay Greene and Marcus Winters, “Public High School Graduation and College-Readiness Rates: 1991-2002,” (2005), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ewp_08.htm.
5 Illinois (14 percent), Indiana (14 percent), Wisconsin (14 percent), Michigan (15 percent), and Minnesota (15 percent) had the lowest percentages of black high school graduates equipped to enroll in a university. Latinos were the most unprepared in Massachusetts (14 percent), Ohio (13 percent), Illinois (12 percent), Michigan (11 percent), and New York (11 percent).
6 Inmates of color have lower levels of education than white inmates. In 1997, 44.1 percent of black state prison inmates and 53 percent of Latino inmates had not graduated from high school or received a GED, compared with 27.2 percent of whites in state prisons. For male inmates ages 20 to 39, 43.9 percent of blacks, 51.8 percent of Latinos, and 27.7 percent of whites had not completed high school. Harlow observes that these men were “markedly less educated than their counterparts in the general population.” See Caroline Wolf Harlow, “Education and Correctional Populations,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington, DC: GPO, 2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ bjs/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf. Another study found that, for males born between 1965 and 1968, three percent of whites and 20 percent of blacks had served time in prison by the time they reached their mid-30s. For black males, nearly 60 percent of high school dropouts were sent to prison by 1999. See Becky Pettit and Bruce Western, “Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration,” American Sociological Review 69 (April 2004): 151-69.
7 The Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice defines “sentenced inmates” as persons with prison terms of one year or longer.
8 The phrase “criminal justice systems” is intentionally used instead of “criminal justice system” because there are 51 such systems in the United States (the 50 states and the federal government). The estimated 6.9 million inmates under the watch of federal or state criminal justice systems include persons either in prison or jail, or on probation or parole. The data are available at the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
9 Alfred Blumstein, “U.S. Criminal Justice Conundrum: Rising Prison Populations and Stable Crime Rates,” Crime &Delinquency 44 (January 1998): 127-35.
10 Sarah Lawrence and Jeremy Travis, “The New Landscape of Imprisonment: Mapping America’s Prison Expansion” (The Urban Institute 2004), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410994.
11 James J. Stephan and Jennifer C. Karberg, “Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 2000,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington, DC: GPO, 2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/csfcf00.pdf.
12 Melissa Sickmund, “Juveniles in Corrections,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ojjdp/202885.pdf.
13 Lynn Bauer and Steven D. Owens, “Justice Expenditures and Employment in the United States, 2001,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/jeeus01.pdf.
14 In fiscal year 2001, seven cents out of every dollar spent by state and local governments went to criminal justice activities. According to Bauer and Owens, “Among all state and local expenditures, 3 percent was for police protection, nearly 3 percent for corrections, and 2 percent for judicial and legal services.” In contrast, these authors note, “30 percent of state and local government spending went to education, 14 percent to public welfare, 7 percent to health and hospitals, and over 4 percent to interest on debt.” See Bauer and Owens 2004, 4.
15 Bauer and Owens 2004.
16 See Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People,” The Military-Industrial Complex, ed. Carroll W. Pursell, Jr. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 206.
17 Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Nils Christie, Crime Control As Industry: Towards Gulags, Western Style, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000); J. R. Lilly and Paul Knepper, “The Corrections-Commercial Complex,” Crime & Delinquency 39 (April 1993): 150-66; Randall G. Shelden, “It’s More Profitable to Treat the Disease than to Prevent it: Why the Prison Industrial Complex Needs Crime” (Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 2004), http://www.cjcj.org/pdf/treat.pdf.
18 L. R. Wray, “A New Economic Reality: Penal Keynesianism,” Challenge 43 (September-October 2000): 51.
19 Wray 2000: 53.
20 Joseph D. Davey, The Politics of Prison Expansion Winning Elections by Waging War on Crime (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998).
21 The phrase “criminal justice systems” is intentionally used instead of “criminal justice system” because there are 51 such systems in the United States (the 50 states and the federal government). The estimated 6.9 million inmates under the watch of federal or state criminal justice systems include persons either in prison or jail, or on probation or parole.
22 Alfred Blumstein, “U.S. Criminal Justice Conundrum: Rising Prison Populations and Stable Crime Rates,” Crime & Delinquency 44 (January 1998): 127-35.
23 John Irwin and Chris Baird, “Fanning the Flames of Fear,” Crime & Delinquency 44 (January 1998), 32.
24 John J. DiIulio Jr., “The Coming of the Super-Predators,” The Weekly Standard, November 27, 1995, http://www.mcsm.org/predator.html.
25 William J. Bennett, John J. DiIulio Jr., and John P. Walters, Body Count: Moral Poverty—and How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 57.
26 DiIulio 1995.
27 William P. Barr, “Crime, Poverty, and the Family,” The Heritage Foundation, 1992), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/HL401.cfm
28 Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, “Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999), http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99.
29 Butts and Travis write, “The violent crime arrest rate fell among every age group between 1994 and 2000, but the decline was proportionally larger among juveniles. The juvenile arrest rate for Violent Crime Index offenses in 2000 was less than two-thirds the rate of 1994.” In fact, in 2002, the violent crime arrest rate for juveniles was “nearly as low as it had been in 1980.” See Butts and Travis 2002: 5.
30 Malcolm F. Feely and Jonathan Simon, “The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implications,” Criminology 30 (November 1992):468.
31 William J. Chambliss, “Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law Enforcement,” Social Problems 41 (May 1994): 177-94; Lusane and Desmond 1991.
32 John Irwin and James Austin, It’s About Time: America’s Imprisonment Binge, 2nd ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997), xvii.
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Adolphus Belk is a professor of Political Science and African American Studies at Winthrop University.
These excerpts are from A New Generation of Native Sons: Men of Color and the Prison-Industrial Complex, a Dellums Commission background report commissioned by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies Health Policy Institute. These excerpts are reprinted with the permission of the Joint Center.
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